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Ever since Krugman (1980), trade costs, which include tariﬀs and transport costs,
have been important features of new trade theory and new economic geography (e.g.
Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999; Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-
Nicoud, 2003). It has long been believed that trade costs have fallen signiﬁcantly over
time. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) estimate that income growth explains 67%, tariﬀ-
rate reductions 25%, transport-cost declines 8% of the average growth of world trade
among OECD countries between the late 1950s and the late 1980s. Nevertheless, there
still exist large border costs even between Canada and the United States having the
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as shown by McCallum (1995) and his successors.
According to Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), “trade costs are broadly deﬁned
to include all costs incurred in getting a good to a ﬁnal user other than the production
cost of the good itself. Among others this includes transportation costs (both freight
costs and time costs), policy barriers (tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers), information costs,
contract enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of diﬀerent currencies, legal
and regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail).” They further
proceed to report that an approximate estimate of the tax equivalent of representative
trade costs for “industrialized countries” amounts to 170%; transport costs, local retail
and wholesale distribution costs, and border-related barriers account for roughly 21%,
55%, and 44% of this estimate, respectively (2.7=1 .21 × 1.55 × 1.44).
There is a sharp distinction between transport costs and tariﬀs. The transport
costs are considered to be exogenous and to disappear, whereas tariﬀs are determined
endogenously by national tariﬀ policies and are redistributed to consumers in importing
countries.
By incorporating these trade costs, we extend Krugman’s (1980) model of ﬁrm
migration, wherein each country engages in tariﬀ competition in order to attain a high
national welfare level. In particular, it diﬀers from Krugman (1980) in that the tariﬀs
1are strategically determined, whereas the transport costs are exogenously given.
The speciﬁc structure of the model yields some interesting results. First, we show
that when the transport cost is large enough, each country imposes a positive tariﬀ.
Such a tariﬀ is shown to harm each other because it distorts market eﬃciency. There-
fore, if both countries can reach mutually binding agreement of free trade, then it is a
Pareto improvement for both countries. On the other hand, when the transport cost
is small enough, we show that one of the two countries does not impose a tariﬀ and
ﬁrms migrate from a zero-tariﬀ country to a positive-tariﬀ c o u n t r y ,l e a d i n gt oac o r e -
periphery structure. We therefore conclude that from a welfare perspective, when the
transport cost is small, it is more desirable to allow than to prohibit ﬁrm migration.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we present the
model and characterize dispersed and agglomerated equilibria for the given tariﬀs. In
Section 3, we analyze the tariﬀ competition in the case of both a large and small
transport cost. In order to substantiate the analytical results, we perform numerical
simulations, using the values of Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) in section 4. Section
5 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
The global economy comprises two countries, indexed by r and s, and involves two
sectors, called the manufacturing sector (M-sector) and the agricultural sector (A-
sector). Each country is endowed with an identical number of homogenous workers
(= consumers) by mass Lr = Ls = L/2. Each worker supplies one unit of labor
inelastically and is perfectly mobile between sectors but spatially immobile between
countries.












2where q(i) represents the consumption of a diﬀerentiated M-good of variety i ∈ [0,n],
n is the mass of varieties, qA is the consumption of the homogenous A-good, σ > 1
measures both the elasticity of demand of any variety and the elasticity of substitution
between any pair of varieties, µ is the expenditure share of M-goods, and α is the
expenditure share of A-good, where 0 <µ<1, 0 < α < 1 and µ + α =1 .E a c h
individual maximizes her utility subject to the income constraint:
Z n
0
p(i)q(i)di + qA = y (2)
where p(i) is the price of the M-good i, y is the income of an individual, and the price
of the A-good is chosen as a numéraire.
Ex-post symmetry between varieties imposes that qrs(i)=qrs for all variety i pro-
duced in country r a n ds o l di nc o u n t r ys.T h u s ,t h eﬁrst-order condition to maximize
the individual utility yields the demand of each variety in country s for a good produced







where prs is the price of any variety produced in country r and sold in country s, ys is










is the price index of M-goods in country s,a n dnr is the mass of ﬁrms in country
r.P r o d u c t d i ﬀerentiation ensures a one-to-one relation between ﬁrms and varieties.
Thus, the number of ﬁrms and varieties in country r is given by nr.
On the production side, ﬁrms in the A-sector produce a homogenous good using
labor under perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Without loss of general-
ity, units are chosen such that one unit of output requires one unit of labor. Assuming
costless transportation of the A-good, the equilibrium wage of workers is equalized
between the countries as wr = ws =1 .1
1We assume µ<1/2 such that factor price equalization holds for any tariﬀ. See Appendix 1 in
Behrens, Lamorgese, Ottaviano and Tabuchi (2004) for more details.
3While both the ﬁrms in the A-sector and all the workers are immobile, the ﬁrms
in the M-sector are mobile between countries. The production technology for any
variety of M-goods needs the same marginal and ﬁxed labor requirements, labeled c
and F respectively, under increasing returns to scale in a monopolistically competitive
market. We assume “iceberg” transport costs both between the countries and within
each country: a ﬁrm in country r has to produce tdtqrs units to satisfy the ﬁnal demand
qrs in country s(6= r), and tdqrr units to satisfy the ﬁnal demand qrr in country r,w h e r e
td(≥ 1) is the local retail and wholesale distribution costs, and t(≥ 1) denotes the
international transport cost. For simplicity, we ignore the domestic transport cost, so
that the transport cost means the international transport cost throughout the paper.
We also assume that country s imposes the ad valorem tariﬀ τs on one unit of M-good
imported from country r, while no tariﬀ is imposed on A-good. The transport costs
“melt” during the process of trade, whereas the tariﬀs do not and are redistributed
equally to workers in importing countries. Given the demand (3), each ﬁrm (i.e., each
owner of capital) in country r maximizes its proﬁts
πr = prrqrrLr +
1
1+τs
prsqrsLs − wr [c(tdqrrLr + tdtqrsLs)+F] (5)
The second term in (5) is discounted by 1+τs owing to the ad valorem tariﬀ in country
s. This is because the share τs/(1 + τs) of export sales is levied by the government in
importing country s,a n dt h es h a r e1/(1 + τs) of export sales is earned by a ﬁrm in
exporting country r.











(1 + τs)wrtdt =( 1+τs)t
(6)
where we normalize c = td (σ − 1)/σ and utilize the factor price equalization wr =










where λr = nr/n is the share of M-ﬁrms in country r with λr +λs =1 , φ = t1−σ is the
freeness of trade, where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
In what follows, we assume that both countries select their tariﬀs simultaneously,
and then after having observed the decisions made, M-ﬁrms decide to enter the market,
choose their locations and prices of M-goods. Therefore, the tariﬀs are determined by
the Nash duopoly game, while the ﬁrms’ choice is determined by the monopolistic
competition. Following the procedure of backward induction, we ﬁr s ts o l v et h es e c o n d
stage of ﬁrm’s decision, given the tariﬀs of both countries in the next two subsections.
2.1 Dispersed conﬁguration
Assuming free entry and exit of M-ﬁrms in the market of each country, the proﬁts
must be zero in equilibrium. Plugging (6) into (5), we have the zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o n












φ(1 + τs)λr +( 1+τs)
σ λs
¸
− F =0 (8)
Solving π∗
r = π∗
s =0and λr+λs =1yields the unique equilibrium distribution of ﬁrms
(b λr,b λs) and the unique equilibrium number of ﬁrms b n.
Unlike the transport costs, the tariﬀs do not disappear during the trading processes.







where τs/(1 + τs) is the tariﬀ share, (psrqsrLrns)/Lr is the total import of M-goods
divided by the number of individuals in country r. Substituting the prices (6) and the






σ λr + φ(1 + τr)λs
(10)
5Each worker in country r has two sources of income: wage income wr and the tariﬀ
revenue T∗
r :





σ λr + φ(1 + τr)λs
(11)
Thus, substituting λr = b λr, λs = b λs,a n dn = b n into (11) for countries r and s,w eh a v e
a system of two linear equations with respect to yr and ys. Solving them and plugging







σ (1 + τs)
σ − φ(2 + ατr)(1+τs)
σ + φ





A1 (τr,τs) ≡ 2(1+τr)
σ (1 + τs)
σ−φ[(1 + τr)
σ (2 + ατs)+( 1+τs)
σ (2 + ατr)]+φ
2 (2 + ατr + ατs)
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r , we obtain the dispersed equilibrium, where the




















σ (1 + τs)
σ − φ
2 (1 + ατr)(1+ατs)
¤ (14)





















σ (1 + τs)
σ − φ
2 (1 + ατr)(1+ατs)
¤
A3 (τr,τs) ≡ (1 + τr)
2σ (1 + τs)
σ − φ(1 + τr)
σ (1 + τs)
σ [1 − (1 − α)τr]
−φ
2 (1 + τr)
σ (1 + 2τr − ατr + ατs + ατrτs)+φ
3 (1 + τr)(1+ατs)
A4 (τr,τs) ≡ (1 + τr)
σ (1 + τs)
σ − φ(1 + τs)
σ [1 − (1 − α)τr] − φ
2 (1 + 2τr − ατr + ατs + ατrτs)
+φ
3 (1 + τr)
1−σ (1 + ατs)











r are given by (14) and (15). Hence, the indirect utility (16) is expressed
as a function of the two strategic variables τr and τs together with the parameters σ,
φ, F, L,a n dα(=1− µ). The strategic variables (τr, τs) are determined in the next
section.
2.2 Agglomerated conﬁguration
We have analyzed the dispersed conﬁguration λ
∗
r ∈ (0,1) in the previous section. How-
ever, λ
int
r in (13) is not necessarily in the interval of (0,1). For example, if the transport
cost t is small, τr is small, and τs is large, then λ
int
r < 0 holds from (12), which implies




s)=( 0 ,1). In this case, solving the zero proﬁt condition (8)




s)=( 0 ,1), we have the agglomerated equilibrium, where the




2σF (1 + ατr)
Solving (11) with λ
c

























7Observe that these utilities do not involve τs because no ﬁrm in country r (λ
c
r =0 )
implies no import in country s.
3T a r i ﬀ competition
Thus far, the tariﬀs are considered to be exogenously given in the location and price
competition by M-ﬁrms. We now proceed to investigate the ﬁrst-stage tariﬀ competi-
tion, where each country noncooperatively chooses its tariﬀ in order to maximize its
national welfare, anticipating the consequences of the competition by M-ﬁrms.
Setting a high tariﬀ has two opposing eﬀects on the welfare. On the one hand,
ah i g ht a r i ﬀ induces in-migration of ﬁrms because ﬁrms want to avoid incurring the
burden of a high tariﬀ. Attracting ﬁrms implies a decrease in the prices of the goods for
in-migration ﬁrms due to reduction in the transport cost t, which enhances the welfare.
On the other hand, a high tariﬀ distorts the market by raising the prices of imported
goods, which decreases the welfare. The country’s welfare is thus depending on which
eﬀects are dominant. It can be analytically veriﬁed in the following subsections that
the former eﬀect dominates the latter in the case of a large transport cost, but that
the reverse is true in the case of a small transport cost.
3.1 When the transport cost is large
Diﬀerentiating the interior distribution λ
∗






when τr is close to τs.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t a t a r i ﬀ reduction leads to a loss of ﬁrms
because ﬁr m sm o v et oah i g h e r - t a r i ﬀ country in order to avoid paying a higher tariﬀ
when exporting M-goods. Such tariﬀ-jumping by ﬁrms that are a source of foreign
direct investments is supported empirically by Blonigen (2002) and theoretically by
Konishi, Saggi and Weber (1999).
8This is true in our framework when the transport cost between the countries is large
(the proof is contained in Appendix 1).
Proposition 1 When the transport cost is suﬃciently large, there exists a Nash equi-









In the presence of a large transport cost between countries, each country attempts
to attract ﬁrms by raising tariﬀs in order to increase market access and avoid paying the
tariﬀ when exporting M-goods. This eﬀect is more important for each noncooperative
country than is the market distortion eﬀect, which results from the imposition of a
high tariﬀ.
A positive tariﬀ adversely aﬀects the other country. In fact, given the same tariﬀ







r is given by (16). We thus obtain the following.
Proposition 2 I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fal a r g et r a n s p o r tc o s t ,t a r i ﬀ competition harms each
other.
Proposition 2 implies that when the transport cost between countries is relatively
large, tariﬀ competition distorts the M-goods market, which leads to a so-called pris-
oners’ dilemma. Therefore, if mutually binding agreement of free trade is possible, the
two countries would beneﬁt more from such an arrangement.
3.2 When the transport cost is small
In the previous subsection, we have seen that a tariﬀ reduction triggers out-migration
of ﬁrms, which decreases the consumer utility. This serves as an incentive for each
9government to set a positive tariﬀ, although it ends up with the prisoners’ dilemma.
However, this is not true when the transport cost t is unimportant.
Reducing the transport cost weakens the market access eﬀect by attracting ﬁrms,
but it does not aﬀect the market distortion eﬀect. Consequently, the former eﬀect is
outweighed by the latter. In fact, it can be shown that setting zero tariﬀ is a dominant
strategy when the transport cost is small enough, as demonstrated below. The small
transport cost presents the opportunity of attaining a socially eﬃcient outcome with no
market-distorting tariﬀs. In fact, it can be veriﬁed that either one of the two countries
chooses zero tariﬀ in Nash equilibrium if the transport cost is small enough (the proof
is contained in Appendix 2).
Proposition 3 When the transport cost is suﬃciently small, there exist Nash equilibria






Proposition 3 suggests that when each country maximizes its welfare by tariﬀ com-
petition, one of the two countries does not impose a tariﬀ for importing goods. Then,
all the ﬁrms would move out from the zero-tariﬀ country because of the inequality (18).
Consequently, no tariﬀ revenue is generated in both countries: no ﬁrm in country r
implies no imports from country r and no tariﬀ revenue in country s despite imposing a
positive tariﬀ; and zero tariﬀ in country r implies no tariﬀ revenue in country r despite
importing M-goods. We may therefore conclude that tariﬀ competition leads to free
trade in spite of the fact that the economy exhibits a core-periphery structure;t h i si si n
sharp contrast to Proposition 1.
We have seen in the previous subsection that reducing the tariﬀ leads to loss of
ﬁrms because they prefer to locate in a higher-tariﬀ country in order to avoid the
tariﬀ barriers in exporting M-goods. Moreover, reducing the tariﬀ decreases the tariﬀ
revenue for each worker. However, a tariﬀ reduction depreciates the prices of imported
goods and, hence, the consumer price index, which in turn increases the consumer
10utility. In fact, V c
r in (17) is decreasing in τr, implying that the peripheral country
has no incentive to impose a tariﬀ in the case of an agglomerated conﬁguration. Due
to the mixed eﬀects of tariﬀ reduction on the welfare, the net eﬀect is generally not
clear. However, if the transport cost is small enough, it can be shown that the losses
are outweighed by the gains from free trade due to the lower prices of imported goods.
Consequently, each country has an incentive to remove the tariﬀ.S t a t e dd i ﬀerently, an
international binding agreement for free trade is not required when the transport cost
is so small that an agglomerated equilibrium is realized.
When τ∗
s À τ∗

















From φ < 1,w eh a v eV c
r <Vc
s : workers in peripheral country r attains a lower welfare
because they have to incur the entire transport cost. Nevertheless, they beneﬁtf r o m
no tariﬀ. That is, country r chooses zero tariﬀ by allowing country s to attract all
ﬁrms; this is more beneﬁcial than engaging in ﬁerce tariﬀ competition.
Finally, when the transport cost between the countries is negligible, we have the
following.
Corollary 1 In the absence of the transport cost, there exists a continuum of Nash
equilibria such that at least one country does not impose a tariﬀ:
τ
∗









s =0 with arbitrary λ
∗
r.











Thus, the ﬁrst-best outcome is attained without any international coordination under
no transport frictions.
114 Simulations
Finally, what happens in the case of an intermediate transport cost? To answer this
question, we must perform a numerical analysis by using Newton methods in Mathe-
matica. Given the parameter values, we can calculate Nash equilibrium tariﬀsn u m e r -
ically. Although we have not proven the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, a rough
simulation indicates that it is unique.
In order to reproduce Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) presented in the introduc-
tion, we set the transport cost at t =1 .21, whereas the local distribution cost td =1 .55
is not needed in the determination of the tariﬀs due to the normalization. If we as-
sume µ =0 .3 and σ =2 .7, then the best response tariﬀs are numerically obtained as
τ∗
r = τ∗
s =0 .44,w h i c hi st h et a r i ﬀ value (border-related trade barriers) in Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004).
Therefore, we set µ =0 .3 and σ =2 .7, and compute the best response tariﬀsf o r
diﬀerent values of the transport cost t, which ranges from 1 to inﬁnity. The results are
summarized as follows:2
(i) If t>b t =1 .15, there is a dispersed conﬁguration with a Nash equilibrium
τ∗
r = τ∗
s > 0 (which corresponds to Proposition 1).
(ii) If 1 ≤ t<b t, there is an agglomerated conﬁguration with a Nash equilibrium
τ∗
s À τ∗
r =0(which corresponds to Proposition 3)
Accordingly, we may say that the Nash equilibrium tariﬀs are positive for large
transport costs and zero for small transport costs. Because the value t =1 .21 of
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) exceeds b t =1 .15, we are in a position of case (i).
That is, choosing a positive tariﬀ by each country is a Nash equilibrium. What if the
transport cost t decreases from 1.21 to 1.15 due to technical progress in the transport
2It is noted in the simulations that we did not ﬁnd any other conﬁgurations other than the fully
dispersed and agglomerated conﬁgurations, and that we did not ﬁnd any multiple equilibria which
often appear in NEG, such as Krugman (1991).
12sector. The above results predicts transition from case (i) to case (ii). That is, the
core-periphery structure with free trade may be realized without any international
coordination not in the far future.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Since regions under study belong to the same country in new economic geography,
transport costs constitute a signiﬁcant fraction of the trade costs; hence, the trade
costs are considered exogenous. On the other hand, in new trade theory, tariﬀ bar-
riers account for a large proportion of the trade costs; therefore, the trade costs are
considered endogenous. We developed a uniﬁed model of the new economic geography
and new trade theory, where the transport costs melt according to the conventional
assumption, but the tariﬀs do not melt and are redistributed equally to consumers.
On analyzing Nash equilibrium of the tariﬀ competition, we showed that when the
transport cost is suﬃciently small, one of the two countries does not impose a tariﬀ,i n
which the core is associated with a positive tariﬀ and the periphery is associated with
zero tariﬀ. Therefore, trade is virtually free. We also showed that in the case of a high
transport cost, tariﬀ competition harms each country, which suggests the necessity of
mutually binding agreement of free trade from a welfare point of view.
It is worth studying several extensions of this model along these lines. First, one
may consider both the transport cost and the tariﬀ of the A-good as well as the M-
goods in order to examine the North-South trade. Second, it may be interesting to
investigate the mobility of workers as well as of capital, which is often assumed in
new economic geography (Krugman, 1991). This would lead to a dramatic increase in
the geographical concentration of industrial activities via self-reinforcing agglomeration
processes. Finally, it may also be interesting to consider using the tariﬀ revenues to
ﬁnance public goods instead of redistributing these revenues equally among workers,
and to reexamine the eﬀect on social welfare.
13Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
When λ
∗
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Since t →∞implies φ → 0, the second term in (20) disappears more quickly than

















= µφ(1 + τr)










R 0 when τr Q
1
σ − 1
This means that (19) is a unique Nash equilibrium. ¥
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
14(a) Interior solution. When λ
∗
r ∈ (0,1),w ew a n tt os h o wt h a t( 2 0 )i sp o s i t i v e
such that any interior solution of λ
∗
r ∈ (0,1) is not an equilibrium outcome in tariﬀ
competition for suﬃciently small t and suﬃciently large τs.
(a1) Since limτs→∞ y∗






2 (1 + τr)
−σ−1
2F [(1 + τs)
σ − φ]
and hence, limτs→∞∂A5 (τr,τs)/∂τr =0for suﬃciently large τs.T h u s , t h e s e c o n d
term in (20) approaches zero.















Thus, we show below that
B2 (τr,φ) ≡ (1 + τr)
σ−1 (1 + τr − στr) − φ > 0
when τr ensures an interior solution of λ
∗
r ∈ (0,1) for φ → 1.






σ − φ(2 + ατr)
2(1+τr)
σ − φ(2 + ατr)
Thus,
B3 (τr,φ) ≡ (1 + τr)
σ − φ(2 + ατr) > 0
is necessary for the existence of a dispersed equilibrium when φ → 1.
It can be readily shown that B2 is decreasing from B2 (0,φ)=1 − φ > 0 to
B2 (τr,φ) < 0 for large τr,a n dt h a tB3 is increasing from B3 (0,φ)=1− 2φ < 0 to
B3 (τr,φ) > 0 for large τr. Hence, there exists a unique τr = τr1 such that B2 (τr,φ) R
0 for τr Q τr1 and a unique τr = τr2 such that B3 (τr,φ) R 0 for τr R τr2.
We deﬁne e τr ≡
p
2(1− φ)/(σ − 1). The Taylor series expansion of B2 (e τr,φ) about
15φ =1is
B2 (e τr,φ)=B2 (e τr,φ)|φ=1 +
∂B2 (e τr,φ)
∂φ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
φ=1




(φ − 1) + R2 < 0
when φ → 1 with φ < 1,w h e r eR2 is a remainder of order (φ − 1)
2.T h u s ,e τr > τr1.
On the other hand, the Taylor series expansion of B3 (e τr,φ) about φ =1is
B3 (e τr,φ)=B3 (e τr,φ)|φ=1 + R3
= −1+R3 < 0
when φ → 1 with φ < 1,w h e r eR3 is a remainder of order (φ − 1).T h u s ,e τr < τr2.B y
combining these results, we have τr1 < τr2. This implies that whenever there exists a
dispersed equilibrium λ
∗
r ∈ (0,1),i tm u s tb et h a tτr > τr2, and hence, τr > τr2 > τr1.
Consequently, B2 (τr,φ) < 0 and limτs→∞ ∂y∗
r/∂τr < 0.T h u s ,t h eﬁr s tt e r mi n( 2 0 )i s
negative.
Since (20) is always negative for suﬃciently small t and suﬃciently large τs,c o u n t r y
r does not choose a tariﬀ that yields an interior solution λ
∗
r ∈ (0,1).
(b) Corner solution. When λ
c
r =0 , the indirect utility is given by V c
r in (17).
S i n c et h i si sd e c r e a s i n gi nτr, the best reply for country r is τr =0 . Hence, τ∗
s >> τ∗
r =
0 is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, when λ
c
r =1 , τ∗
r >> τ∗
s =0is a Nash equilibrium.
¥
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